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This paper presents a new approach to the theory of the firm by identifying factor 
complementarities as central to the determination of the firm’s boundaries. The 
factor complementarities may take a variety of forms: technological and 
informational complementarities, as well as economies of scale and scope. We 
examine the tradeoff between the gains from these complementarities and 
transactions costs. In so doing, we must abandon the standard dichotomy between 
the determinants of plant size and firm size. The influence of factor 
complementarities on firm size is examined in partial and general equilibrium 
frameworks. 
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 The modern literature on the boundaries of the ￿rm focuses primarily on three major costs of
organizing ￿rms: communication and coordination costs (e.g. Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975));
principal agent problems (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmstrom (1982)); and hold-up problems
(e.g. Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Grout (1984)). Broadly speaking, these costs may be viewed
as di⁄erent types of transactions costs. They have also given rise to the notion that the ￿rm may
be identi￿ed as a system of property rights (e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986)), an incentive system
(e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994)), and a communication network (e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont
(1994)), and so on.
Another literature deals with plant size (e.g. Viner (1932), Robinson (1958), Baumol, Panzer
and Willig (1982)). This literature emphasizes technological considerations, such as ￿xed costs and
economies of scale and scope. In the literature on the size of ￿rms, it is generally taken for granted
that the factors a⁄ecting plant size (in particular, economies of scale and scope) are not relevant to
￿rm size. Our paper calls this conventional wisdom into question.
Our analysis instead identi￿es the ￿rm as a ￿pool of factor complementarities,￿and we examine
how these complementarities interact with transactions costs.1 When these interactions are taken into
account, we must abandon the dichotomy between the determinants of plant size and of ￿rm size.
Both sets of in￿ uences have a role to play in the determination of the ￿rm￿ s boundaries. But since
the role of factor complementarities has not received much attention in the recent literature on the
￿rm￿ s boundaries, we will focus on this aspect here, while transactions costs will be modeled quite
schematically.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 deals with preliminaries, outlining various types of
factor complementarities and their implications for the boundaries of the ￿rm. Section 2 runs through
some simple, partial equilibrium models to show how these complementarities in￿ uence the ￿rm￿ s
boundaries. Section 3 presents a general equilibrium model in which the boundaries of di⁄erent ￿rms
a⁄ect one another and are determined simultaneously, so as to yield a model of market structure (viz.,
the degree of imperfect competition). Section 4 concludes.
1 Preliminaries
Factor complementarities (and substitutabilities) come in various guises. First, the technological com-
plementarities (and substitutabilities) may be identi￿ed in terms of the cross-partial derivatives in
1Our work extends the analysis of Lindbeck and Snower (1996, 2000). Whereas the latter focuses on intra-personal
complementarities, we are concerned with inter-factor (particularly inter-personal) complementarities.
1a production function. For the production function Q = f (F), where F =(F1;:::;Fn) is a vector
of factors, the factors Fi and Fj are technological complements when
@2Q




Second, there are informational complementarities among di⁄erent types of labor. Speci￿cally,
suppose that through learning-by-doing, each type of worker gains information that is useful to other
types of workers. In practice, the natural domain for such informational complementarities is the
￿rm (rather than its plants), because ￿rms generally encourage the exchange of knowledge among
their employees, but often strongly discourage them from sharing it with employees in other ￿rms2
Thus the natural domain of informational complementarities is the ￿rm, rather than its plants. Let
H be the ￿rm￿ s knowledge capital, which is a public good within the ￿rm but not beyond it. Let
H = H (L) be the ￿rm￿ s production function for knowledge capital,3 where L =(L1;:::;Lm) is a vector
of labor types. The ￿rm￿ s production function (di⁄erent from the one above) may be expressed as
Q = f [g1 (H)L1;:::;gm (H)Lm], where gi (H) describes how the ￿rm￿ s knowledge capital enhances the
productivity of type-i labor, so that gi (H)Li is type-i labor in e¢ ciency units. Then, in the absence
of technological complementarities (fL1L2 = 0), the informational complementarties between labor of










Third, in contrast to the inter-factor complementarities above, there are intra-factor complemen-
tarities (or substitutabilities). Speci￿cally, consider a vector of factors F = (F1;:::;FI) producing the
output Q = f (F), and now consider a proportional increase in all the factors ￿F = ￿F producing
the additional output ￿Q, where ￿ (> 1) is a constant. If the two sets of factors, F and ￿F, are
complementary, then ￿Q > ￿Q (increasing returns to scale). If the two sets are substitutable, then
￿Q < ￿Q (diminishing returns to scale); and if the two sets are independent, then ￿Q = ￿Q (con-
stant returns to scale). In this way, returns to scale may be identi￿ed as the outcome of intra-factor
complementarities or substitutabilities.
Fourth, there are complementarities (or substitutabilities) among the same set of factors in the
production of additional products. In particular, suppose that the vector of factors F is used to produce
a vector of goods Q = (Q1;:::;Qn) via the production function ￿(Q) = ￿(F). Let the cost function
C (Q) be the solution to the problem of minimizing the factor cost pF (where p is a vector of factor
2They often even have various sanctions - legal and economic - to prevent sensitive information about the ￿rm from
reaching their competitors.
3Under learning by doing, knowledge is created as an automatic by-product of working in the ￿rm. The production
function for knowledge capital shows how the stock of knowledge available to the ￿rm depends on the labor services of
all labor types.
4Observe that these complementarities operate solely through the exchange of knowledge, and thus are distinct from
the technological complementarities that operate through the cross-partials of the production function.
2prices) subject to the above production function (for given Q). Similarly, let Ci (Qi) be the minimum
factor cost of producing just output Qi (an element of the output vector Q). If the use of factors in the
production of goods Qi and Qj (j 6= i) is complementary, then there are increasing returns to scope,
so that C (Q) <
Pn
i=1 Ci (Qi), where n is the number of goods under consideration. Alternatively,
if C (Q) >
PM
i=1 Ci (Qi), then there are diminishing returns to scope; and if C (Q) =
PM
i=1 Ci (Qi),
there are constant returns to scope. In this way, returns to scope may be viewed in terms of factor
complementarities or substitutabilities in the production of di⁄erent goods.5
We will show how the factor complementarities above interact with transactions costs in setting
the boundaries of the ￿rm. We de￿ne the ￿rm￿ s boundaries as an array (Q1;:::;Qn), specifying the
amounts of all outputs that the ￿rm produces. The number of elements in this vector describes the
￿rm￿ s scope and the magnitude of all the elements describes its size. To highlight how the various
factor complementarities above can a⁄ect the boundaries of the ￿rm (rather than merely in￿ uencing
plant size), we will focus on complementarities and transactions costs that are ￿rm-wide (rather than
merely plant-wide).6
It is commonly alleged that although technological phenomena - such as inter-factor complemen-
tarities, economies of scale and scope - are relevant to plant size, they are irrelevant to ￿rm size, for two
reasons. First, technological economies allegedly set no lower limit to ￿rm size, since the underlying
factors may be controled by more than one ￿rm. Second, technological diseconomies allegedly set no
upper limit to ￿rm size, since the ￿rm is always at liberty to split into independent subsidiaries and
thus avoid such diseconomies.7
One reason for calling this conventional wisdom into question is that it is generally ine¢ cient for
more than one ￿rm to control a common set of complementary factors. If there were multiple domains
of authority to decide how such factors are to be used, the di⁄erent ￿rms would need to be engaged in
an ongoing process of bargaining. Conducting these bargains would be costly and possibly vulnerable
to hold-up, without countervailing bene￿ts. For this reason, it is e¢ cient for a single ￿rm to have
exclusive right over a given set of factors.
Moreover, ￿rms generally cannot avoid diseconomies through the creation of subsidiaries as an
alternative to market transactions among independent ￿rms, because there is an important di⁄erence
5Returns to scope may of course also arise if factor prices change with factor use in such as way as to drive a wedge
between C (Q) and
PM
i=1 Ci (Qi).
6For example, technological complementarities between di⁄erent factors may span several plants, as when several
plants make use of a common ￿rm facility, e.g. a storage facility, advertising, or recruitment. For analogous reasons,
economies of scale and scope may cover several plants as well. Informational complementarities may also extend across
plants, such as when workers in di⁄erent plants share a common data base or participate in common teams. The
transactions costs in our analysis will also be ￿rm-wide.
7See, for example, Tirole (1989, p. 20-21).
3between a subsidiary and an independent ￿rm. If the subsidiary goes bankrupt, the parent company
is ￿nancially liable; whereas bankruptcy of another ￿rm has no direct ￿nancial implications for the
company in question. Thus it is legally impossible for a ￿rm to split itself up into totally independent
units. It follows that the managers of a ￿rm have a natural responsibility, and hence interest, in
the running of their subsidiaries. For these reasons, managers are unable to avoid intervening in the
activities of subsidiaries, and thus ￿rms cannot escape the standard diseconomies of scale and scope -
such as those caused by bureaucratic waste, internal politiking, the scarcity of entrepreneurial talent
and the associated cost of giving entrepreneurs additional responsibilities, and so on8 - by having
subsidiaries with complete autonomy.
With this in mind, we now proceed to show how factor complementarities, in conjunction with
transactions costs, a⁄ect the boundaries of the ￿rm.
2 Factor Complementarities and the Boundaries of a Firm
This section presents a partial-equilibrium analysis of the ￿rm, examining the ￿rm in isolation from
other ￿rms. (General equilibrium is covered in the next section.) We consider the di⁄erent types of
factor complementarities in turn.
2.1 Economies of Scale
In the presence of economies of scale for ￿rms (such as economies of marketing and product design,
or those related to customer good will for a ￿rm), there is a tradeo⁄: while increasing the size of the
￿rm enables it to exploit these economies, it also generates additional transactions costs. To focus on
￿rm-wide economies, we consider a ￿rm that produces a homogeneous good (Q) through x identical
plants, each of which may be viewed as a bundle of factors (F).9 The ￿rm ￿ s economies of scale across
plants be represented by the following production function
q = Ax
1+￿ (1)
where A and ￿ are positive constants, measuring the magnitude of the scale economies.
Let each plant have a ￿xed operating cost of ￿ per period of analysis. The ￿rm￿ s transactions costs
8Further limits to the boundaries of the ￿rm are given by sources of ￿rms￿￿nance. To achieve portfolio diversi￿cation,
lenders commonly prefer lending to a number of independent ￿rms rather than to a single ￿rm with an equivalent number
of subsidiaries.
9Then the size of the ￿rm can be measured by the number of its plants.
4are speci￿ed in a simple, stylized way, to capture the usual picture of transactions costs increasing
with the size of the ￿rm.10 In particular, we assume that the ￿rm￿ s transactions costs (viz., the sum
of the internal and external transactions costs) are given by
z = Bx
1+￿ (2)
where B and ￿ are positive constants, so that the transactions costs rise at an increasing rate with the
number of plants. This general representation is convenient and appropriate for our purposes because
our analysis is concerned only with transactions costs insofar as they are a⁄ected by the number of
plants (or scale of factor use). We may interpret our transactions cost function as showing how a rise
in the number of plants increases search costs for factor inputs and customers, communication costs
among employees, or the cost of hold-up and principal-agent problems within the ￿rm.
In this context, we can analyze the degree of horizontal integration. The ￿rm maximizes its pro￿t
￿ = Ax1+￿ ￿ ￿x ￿ Bx1+￿with respect to the number of plants x. The ￿rst-order condition for the
optimal number of plants (or scale of factor use) is
@￿
@x
= A(1 + ￿)x
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B (1 + ￿)x
￿ = 0 (3)








It is straightforward to extend this analysis to cover a ￿rm￿ s degree of vertical integration. Specif-
ically, suppose that the ￿nal output is produced by means of a chain of intermediate goods. For
10These are the sum of the internal transactions costs (arising within the ￿rm) and external transactions costs (arising
from the ￿rm￿ s market transactions with other ￿rms). Although in practice this sum is not always monotonically
increasing in the size of the ￿rm, the ￿rm in our model has an incentive to expand until it reaches the range in which
further increases in ￿rm size to lead to increases in the sum of the transactions costs.









@x=@x < 0 by the second-order condition, and @ @￿
@x=@A > 0.
5simplicity, consider the following vertical production chain:
q (1) = Ax
1+￿(0)
q (2) = q (1)
1+￿(1)
q (3) = q (2)
1+￿(2)
:::
q (S) = q (S ￿ 1)
1+￿(S￿1)
In the ￿rst stage of production, the intermediate good q (1) is produced by means of the factor bundles
x (which were interpreted as plants in the previous model). In the next stage, the intermediate good
q (2) is produced by means of the intermediate good q (1); and so on. At each production stage, the
economies of scale are given by the parameter ￿(i), i = 0;:::;S, where S is the number of productive
stages integrated (vertically) in the ￿rm. Thus the ￿rm￿ s production function may be expressed as
q (S) = x
￿(S) (5)
where ￿ (S) =
QS￿1
i=1 (1 + ￿(i)).
Furthermore, let the ￿rm￿ s transactions costs12 be given by






The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t now is
￿ = q (S) ￿ ￿x ￿ z
= x







to be maximized with respect to x. In this context, it is easy to show that a su¢ ciently large increase
in returns to scale ￿(j) leads to an increase in the pro￿t-maximizing number of production stages
S￿. Thus the ￿rm￿ s degree of vertical integration is a⁄ected positively by its economies of scale across
production stages.
12These transactions costs are speci￿ed along the same lines as in (2).
62.2 Economies of Scope
To analyze economies of scope (the degree of horizontal integration), let the potential goods that the
￿rm could produce lie on a unit circle, where the distance between two points on this circle is inversely
related to their economies of scope. Moreover, the larger the number of goods the ￿rm produces, the
greater are its internal transactions costs. Thus the ￿rm faces a tradeo⁄ between economies of scope
and transactions costs. The ￿rm￿ s problem is to ￿nd the pro￿t-maximizing length of its product
segment on the circle of potential products.
For simplicity, let the revenue from good i be R(Qi), where i = 1;:::;N, RQi (Qi) > 0, and
RQiQi (Qi) < 0. Let the production cost be vNQi ￿ b￿ (N), where v and b are positive constants
and b￿ (N) speci￿es the economies of scope, with ￿N;￿NN > 0, so that there are positive economies of
scope: The constant b measures the magnitude of these economies of scope. Let the ￿rm￿ s transactions
costs associated with the production of each good be zp (Qi) and its transactions costs associated with
the coordination of the production of di⁄erent goods be zc (N). Note that, for simplicity, the revenues
and costs are symmetric across products. Thus the pro￿t-maximizing amounts of di⁄erent outputs
will be equal: Q￿
i = Q￿.
Then the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is ￿ = NR(Q)￿vNQ+b￿ (N)￿Nzp (Q)￿zc (N). The ￿rst-order condition
for each output is
RQi (Qi) ￿ v ￿ z
p
Qi (Qi) = 0 (7)
which determines the pro￿t-maximizing level of each output. The ￿rst-order condition with respect
to the number of products is
R(Q
￿) ￿ vQ
￿ + b￿N (N) ￿ z
p (Q) ￿ z
c
N (N) = 0 (8)
From this condition, it is evident that the greater are the economies of scope (b), the greater the
number of goods (N) that the ￿rm produces (i.e. the greater the degree of horizontal integration),




Note that this result is the outcome of the interaction between economies of scope and transactions
costs. In the absence of internal transactions costs, the number of goods per ￿rm and the amount of
each good produced would be indeterminate. It is only on account of the internal transactions costs
that economies of scope directly a⁄ect the boundaries of the ￿rm.
72.3 Inter-Factor Complementarities
Since the role of technological inter-factor complementarities in determining the ￿rm￿ s boundaries may
be analyzed along similar lines to the role of economies of scale (above), we focus on informational
complementarities here. As employees gain information about their customers, their suppliers, and so
on, this new information is added to the ￿rm￿ s stock of knowledge capital. Through this knowledge
capital, employees within a ￿rm become complements, even if they do not work within the same
plant. The information gained by one employee is communicated and becomes useful in enhancing
the productivity of other employees. We present a simple model in which the ￿rm faces a tradeo⁄
between these complementarities and the transactions costs considered above. This model is not meant
to be comprehensive or general; it just provides an illustration of how inter-factor complementarities
can a⁄ect the boundaries of the ￿rm.
Consider a ￿rm that comprises N plants.13 Plant i (i = 1;:::;N) employs Li workers. Workers
accumulate knowledge through learning-by-doing; however, unlike the conventional learning-by doing
models, the resulting knowledge is useful not just to the employee who acquired it, but to other
employees as well.14 Let the production of knowledge capital be given by H = (aL)
￿, where L =
PN
i=1 Li, and a and ￿ are positive constants, 0 < ￿ < 1. Moreover, let the output of plant i be
Q = (aL)
￿ Li. In short, the average productivity of the employees in each plant depends on the
knowledge gained by all employees in the ￿rm, which in turn depends on the total employment of the
￿rm.15 The constant a measures the degree of informational complementarity among the employees.
Let the transactions costs associated with the employees in plant i be 1
1+￿￿L
1+￿￿
i , ￿￿ > 0 (a constant),
and let those transactions costs arising from the coordination of the various plants be 1
1+￿￿N1+￿￿,
￿￿ > 0 (a constant). Let wages be determined through bargaining in which workers capture a fraction
￿ of the available rent. Then the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t may be expressed as ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
PN







1+￿￿N1+￿￿. The ￿rst-order conditions are (@￿=@Li) = 0 and (@￿=@N) = 0, which












13It makes no substantive di⁄erence whether these plants produce the same product or di⁄erentiated products.
14The mechanisms are analogous to those covered in some endogenous growth models.
15For simplicity, our model is static. For this purpose, we make the implicit assumption that knowledge depreciates
100 percent in moving from one period of analysis to the next. In general, of course, knowledge depreciates more slowly
and thus a worker￿ s productivity comes to depend on the stock of knowledge accumulated through all the work done
in the ￿rm over the present and past. It is straightforward to extend our model accordingly and generate analogous
qualitative results in the steady state.
8respectively. Solving these equations simultaneously, we obtain the pro￿t-maximizing number of plants




















Since ￿￿ ￿ ￿ + 1 > 0, ￿￿ ￿ 1, and ￿￿ (￿￿ + ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿) > 0, we ￿nd that an increase in the comple-









Thus far we have considered the boundaries of an individual ￿rm independently from the boundaries
of other ￿rms. We now extend our analysis by putting the behavior of ￿rms into a general equilibrium
context, enabling us to investigate the determination of market structure. In a simple analytical
framework, we derive simultaneously the number of ￿rms and the size of each ￿rm, and show that
these two variables are naturally interdependent.
Our analysis points to a broad vision of ￿rms as institutions designed to exploit factor comple-
mentarities. We will show that the greater are these complementarities, relative to the ￿rms￿internal
transactions costs, the greater will be the size of ￿rms in the general equilibrium and the smaller will
be the equilibrium number of ￿rms.16
To express this vision, let us think of factors positioned in a production space in accordance with
their complementarities: the shorter the distance between two factors in this space, the greater the
complementarity between them. Our analysis will indicate that ￿rms position themselves in this
production space so as to maximize the pro￿t opportunities from the factor complementarities. In
this way, factor complementarities are shown to in￿ uence both the boundaries of each ￿rm and the
number of ￿rms.
How such a general equilibrium system is modeled depends on the types of factor complementarity
under consideration. For brevity, we will consider only the ￿rst type of complementarity above,
namely, that which gives rise to returns to scale. In particular, suppose that homogeneous bundles of
16The partial equilibrium analysis above of course does not deal with the equilibrium number of ￿rms at all.
9factors are distributed uniformly around a unit circle, where the circumference of the circle (unity)
represents the aggregate factor supply. Di⁄erent ￿rms occupy di⁄erent segments of the factor circle.
Figure 1, for example, illustrates an economy containing three ￿rms. The segment occupied by a
single ￿rm (indexed by f = 1;2;3), consists of two parts, a factor bundle x(f) that is used in produc-
tion (the production segment) and a factor bundle z (f) that covers the ￿rm￿ s internal transactions
(the transactions segment). The sum of the two factor bundles comprises the total factor use of the










Fig. 1: Equilibrium Boundaries of
Firms
As in the previous section, the ￿rm faces a tradeo⁄ between returns to scale and internal transac-
tions costs. The returns to scale of ￿rm f are given by the production function
q (f) = Ax(f)
1+￿ (13)
where the output q (f) is assumed to be a nondurable consumption good, and A and ￿ are positive
constants. For simplicity, let us now interpret x(f) as ￿rm f￿ s employment level (rather than as a
factor bundle, as above). The ￿rm￿ s internal transactions costs (measured as real factor costs) are
given by
z (f) = Bx(f)
1+￿ (14)
where B and ￿ are positive constants. Note that all ￿rms are assumed to face symmetric production
and transactions technologies, and thus symmetric revenues and costs. The total length of the segment
that ￿rm f occupies on the unit circle is x(f)+z (f). The number of ￿rms in the economy is MF, so
10that f = 1;:::;MF.
Suppose that the economy contains a ￿xed number MH of identical households. For simplicity, let
household h (h = 1;:::;MH) have the following utility function:
U (h) = q (h)
￿ ￿ e[x(h) + z (h)] (15)
where q (h) is the household￿ s consumption, ￿ (a positive constant) is the elasticity of utility with
respect to consumption, x(h) is the hours of work supplied by household h, and e is a positive
constant.
Let X be the aggregate amount of factors devoted to production and Z be the aggregate amount
of factors devoted to internal transactions. In equilibrium, the aggregate factor supplies (by the





















Hz (h) = M
Fz (f) (19)
In the general equilibrium, ￿rms position themselves around the factor circle so as to exploit
the available gains from trade. For simplicity, we assume that externalities, imperfect competition
and distributional issues are absent. (In particular, imperfect competition is absent in our analysis
despite economies of scale in production, because at the margin these economies are dominated by
diseconomies in transactions activities.) Consequently the general equilibrium coincides with the
social optimum. This implies that each ￿rm expands until the marginal utility from producing more
output is exactly equal to the marginal disutility from using factors to cover the costs of its internal
transactions.
The general equilibrium number of ￿rms (MF￿) and the general equilibrium size of each ￿rm
(measured by x￿ (f) + z￿ (f)) is such that there are no further pro￿t opportunities to be exploited.
11Pro￿t opportunities arise when it is possible to change the number of ￿rms (and thus, for given factor
supplies, change the size of each ￿rm) so as to make the households better o⁄. To ￿nd the equilibrium




￿ ￿ e[x(h) + z (h)]) (20)
subject to the production function (13), the transactions function (14), and the factor constraints (16)
- (19).




￿ e, where Q is aggregate output.17





￿1+￿. Similarly, using (18) and (19), ￿rm f￿ s transaction function (14) may be expressed
























































h=1 (x(h) + z (h)) = 1.
12Furthermore, in equilibrium, x(f) = X￿
MF￿ = ￿, and since @￿







In words, the greater are the economies of scale in production (the greater is ￿):
￿ the smaller will be the equilibrium number of ￿rms (F ￿),
￿ the greater will be the size of each ￿rm (x￿ (f) + z￿ (f)),
￿ the smaller will be the aggregate amount of factors devoted to production (X￿),18 and
￿ the larger will be the aggregate amount of factors devoted to internal transactions (Z￿).
4 Conclusion
This paper has provided an account of the ￿rm as a pool of factor complementarities. Through a
sequence of models we have shown how factor complementarities, together with the standard trans-
actions costs, can determine the boundaries of the ￿rm. Identifying factor complementarities as a
unifying concept, our analysis is an attempt to integrate recent theories of the ￿rm (that emphasize
communication and coordination costs, principal-agent problems, and hold-up) with the literature on
economies of scale and scope for individual production plants.
18Intuitively, the ￿rm takes advantage of greater scale economies by economizing on its use of factors in production,
while utilizing more factors for internal transactions.
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